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When the government provides public services necessary to production tax evasion results in some degree of 
income redistribution which may imply an higher or a lower level of aggregate income in the long-run. The 
outcome mainly depends on the burden of fiscal pressure. If the tax administration is harmed by corruptibility 
of some agents then the performance of the economy is also affected by the diffusion of corruption, its impact 
depending upon the cost of detecting a bribe agreement. When such cost varies with the stage of development, as 
it happens if the latter determines the level of transparency, then poverty traps may emerge and the steady state 
level of income will depend on the initial condition. Some implications of the model are in line with recent 
empirical evidence. 
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   1 Introduction
Thispaperdevelopsa simplemodel wheretax evasion, corruption, and their
deterrence arejointly determined with capital accumulation, in a framework
where the government provides public services necessary to production. In
general, tax evasion and corruption are found to have ambiguous e¤ects on
the level of economic development and to result in some degree of income
redistribution. Tax evasion increases the amount of resources some entre-
preneurs may retain for private investment but it also reduces the amount
of public services supplied by the government, thus inducing a negative ex-
ternality to the entire economy. The net e¤ect on capital accumulation and
welfare depends on the burden of …scal pressure. When the government
tends to heavily distorts the composition between public and private inputs
of production, in favor of the public one, tax evasion mitigates the ensuing
ine¢ciency by reducing the e¤ective level of taxation and thus the size of
the public sector. The peculiar e¤ect of bribery in tax administration rests
on recognizing that its detection is related to the level of trasparency in the
economy, that is on the di¢culty to detect the bribes. At an initial stage
of development the level of trasparency can be very low, thus determining a
very high cost of detecting bribery. In this case, a poverty trap due to the
pervasiveness of corruption may emerge.
Barreto (2000) and Ellis and Fender (2003) also investigate the impli-
cations of misbehavior on economic growth driven by public capital accu-
mulation. In both papers public agents who have discretionary power in
supplying public goods may appropriate of rents by determining a lower
amount of the goods.1 In the present paper misbehavior is instead related
to entrepreneurs and public agents, whose choices determine the amount
of resources the government can raise through taxation. Thus, the present
analysis may be regarded as complementary to previous ones. The neces-
sity of raising funds in order to supply public services provides the rationale
for the government of taxing entrepreneurs pro…ts. Rational entrepreneurs,
however, may decide to underreport the tax base in order to save on taxes.
Thus, the government assigns to some individuals the task of auditing a
1Barreto (2000) assumes that self-seeking public agents, acting as representatives of
the government, exploit the monopoly power that the government has over the provision
of public goods, thus determining that less public goods are provided at higher prices.
Moreover, by assuming that the public sector is subject to bureaucratic red-tape and
that corruption can alleviate red-tape, it follows that the corruption equilibrium may be
Pareto superior to the bureaucracy plagued competitive equilibrium: corruption implies
the transfer of resources that would have otherwise been lost to bureaucracy. Ellis and
Fender (2003) assume that it cannot be veri…ed until a later date whether the government
has applied tax revenues to public capital accumulation or simply consumed them. The
higher is the time lag in public capital production the higher is the corruption-output
ratio.
2subset of tax reports. However, since any auditor may conceal the evidence
of evasion, he might decide to take a bribe from the entrepreneur in return
fornot reporting his evasion. Thus, corruptibility in tax administration pro-
vides the rationale for the existence of some individuals who investigate on
bribery.2
The main assumptions of the model are as follow. First, I consider the
behavior of taxpayers-entrepreneurs facing the probability that evasion is
documented, once an audit takes place, positively related to the amount
of evasion. As noted by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000), this feature of the
veri…cation technology characterizes most tax systems. Second, in order to
deter tax evasion the government is assumed to set a maximal …ne, that is a
…ne equal to the disposableincome of the taxpayer. This assumption is con-
sistent with one of the most popular conclusion of the economic literature
on crime deterrence, which implies that maximal …ne is an important policy
instrument to maximize welfare (Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell, 2001).
Themain conclusions of the paper, however, remain true even relaxing such
assumption, the crucial feature being an inverse relationship between the
expected income in case of evasion and the tax rate. Third, in the case
of corruptibility the probability of detecting corruption is endogenously de-
termined. In particular, the government relates the incentive to detect a
bribe agreement to the…nefor evasion. This seems a natural assumption as
corruption in tax administration implies that such …ne does not accrue to
the public revenue. Moreover, it recognizes that the …ne structure set by a
legislator usually a¤ects both the incentive to misbehave and the incentive
to monitoring misbehavior. The resulting deterrence structure implies that
an higher level of …scal pressure induces more evasion and may favor the
di¤usion of corruption and that a lower rate of corruption, determined by
an higher…ne, could entail as side-e¤ect a larger size of evasion. Fourth, the
production-side of the economy is based on the work of Barro (1990); that
is, there is a single composite good which is a function of private capital
and public services, the latter produced from public revenues. Finally, each
individual in the economy makes his choice taking as given others actions;
in particular, each entrepreneur does not internalizethee¤ect ofhisdecision
on the level of public services supplied by the government.
In the present framework, the share of taxable income available for con-
sumption and saving depends on whether the entrepreneur is audited and,
in case of auditing, on whether the evasion is detected. In the latter case,
such sharedepends upon the di¤usion ofcorruption. Sincethetotal amount
of resources raised by the government determines the quantity of public ser-
vices necessary to production, for any given level of taxation the decision
of the group of entrepreneurs about the size of evasion a¤ects the aggregate
2This simpli…ed two-levels hierarchy resembles that in Kofman and Lawarrée (1993).
3level of output and in turn the level of taxable income itself. Thus, when
the government provides public services necessary to production tax eva-
sion results in some degree of income redistribution which may imply either
an higher or a lower level of economic development. In particular, if the
government tends to heavily distorts the composition between public and
private inputs of production, tax evasion might mitigate such ine¢ciency
by reducing the amount of public resources. Moreover, the long-run perfor-
mance of the economy is also a¤ected by corruption, its impact depending
upon the cost of detecting the bribes. In particular, when such cost varies
with the stage of economic development, history matters and poverty traps
may emerge.
Therest ofthepaperisas follows. Section2 presentsthemodel economy.
In section 3 I derive the equilibrium levels of evasion and corruption, for a
given level ofcapital, andprovidesomecomparativestaticsresults. Section4
illustratestheimpact oftax evasion and corruption on capital accumulation.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The structure of the model
Consider a two period overlapping generations economy consisting of risk-
neutral individuals with constant size. In each period the young consist of a
large number J of privateentrepreneurs and ofN publicagentsengadged by
the government. Both N and J (with N < J) are exogenously given. The
young divide the disposable income resulting from their activity between
…rst-period consumption and saving. The saving in period t contributes to
generate the capital stock in period t+1. Apart from the level of wealth,
there are not relevant di¤erences among individuals when old. The old
simply consume all their wealth, that is the saving and any interest rate
they earn on saving held from period t to period t+1. There is someprivate
capital stock K0 that is owned equally by all individuals of the initial old
generation.
Output Y is produced by entrepreneurs using private capital K, rented
from old individuals, and free public productive services G, supplied by
the government. In particular, following Barro (1990) among others I con-
centrate on nonrival and nonexcludable type of public goods and assume a
Cobb-Douglas production function. Hence, in period t a young entrepreneur






with ¯ · 1¡°.3 Market for capital is perfectly competitive so that capital
3A more standard economy structure with working households in each generation and
both labor as well as capital production inputs is easy to accomodate.
4rented is paid its marginal product. It follows that the gross pro…t Mj;t of
the j-th entrepreneur is
Mj;t = Yj;t ¡rtKj;t =(1¡¯)Yj;t. (2)
To raise resources for supplying G, the government levies the entrepre-
neurs pro…ts at rate ¿, which is assumed to be constant over time. The
tax system of the economy relies on voluntary compliance in that each en-
trepreneur pays taxes based on the level of reported pro…t. The tax base,
however, is not easily observable by the government tempting the rational
entrepreneur to underreport the level of pro…t in order to reduce the tax
liability. Thus, the government sets up a …ne for evasion and assigns to Na
auditors, a subset of N, thetask ofauditing a subset ofthe tax reports. The
auditors, however, are able to conceal evidenceof evasion in return of bribes
paid by the entrepreneurs. Therefore, the government also copes with the
problem of corruptibility allowing for monitoring of auditors by Ni inspec-
tors, a subset ofN. Thecomposition of the public sector work-force, that is
Na and Ni, will be determined within the model. There is no coordination
issue here so each auditor veri…es honesty of a single entrepreneur and may
be inspected by a single inspector; an entrepreneur never gets inspected by
two auditors. The government pays the net of taxes wage Wt to all public
agents.
By denoting with R the total revenue of the government and assuming
that at any period t the government runs a balanced budget, it follows
Rt =Gt +NWt (3)
where Rt includes the taxes voluntary paid by the entrepreneurs and the
…nes accruing to the government, and N = Na +Ni.
In order to concentrate on the e¤ects of tax evasion and corruption on
capital acumulation, asimplebehavioral ruleisassumedfortheconsumption-
saving choice: all individuals in the economy share a constant saving rate,









where Vj denotes the level of disposable income of the j-th entrepreneur.
Finally, to simplify the analysis I assume that capital depreciates fully
from one period to another; thus, the capital stock in period t +1 is the
amount saved by the young in period t:
Kt+1 = St.
53 Tax evasion, corruption and deterrence
Three types of individuals characterize the young of any generation: en-
trepreneurs, auditors and inspectors. The present section deals with the
strategic choices of a single entrepreneur, facing with the decision of how
much tax base to report to the government, a single auditor, facing with the
decision ofwhether ornot to takea bribe for concealing evidence of evasion,
and a single inspector, who has to decide if investigating on the possibility
of bribery.
The basic framework in studying tax evasion rests on the assumption
that the true tax base of the taxpayer is costly observable by the tax au-
thority, tempting a rational taxpayerto underreport thetax basein orderto
reduce the tax liability (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Graetz, Reinganum
and Wilde, 1986). The private cost of exploiting this opportunity is related
to the pecuniary and nonpecuniary penalty the taxpayer faces if the evasion
will be detected. The original contributions have been extended along a
number of directions. In particular, Chander and Wilde (1992), Hindricks,
Keen and Muthoo (1999), and Sanyal, Gang and Goswami (2000) evaluate
the consequences of assuming that tax auditing can be performed by a cor-
ruptible o¢cial, who takes a bribe for not reporting the detected evasion.4
In the following I depart from previous work by modelling the probability
of detecting corruption which was otherwise considered exogenous.
3.1 The taxpayer decision
Consider a single taxpayer-entrepreneur whose level of taxable pro…t is M.
(Index j is omitted to simplify the exposition.) Let denote the …ne for
tax evasion with ©e and the probability of detecting underreport with q.
Moreover, let assume the taxpayer expects that, with a given probability
Â, the public agent eventually in charge for controlling his tax report will
accept a bribeb for not reporting theevidenceoftax evasion and that, with
a given probability m, he also expects that the bribe agreement would be
detected. The entrepreneur’s problem amounts to determine the fraction of
pro…t, ®, to report to the tax authority.
Asregards to the assumptions, theprobability of detecting evasion isas-
sumed inversely related to the share of reported pro…t: q(¢) = ap(®), with
0 · p(®) · 1, p® < 0, p®;® ¸ 0, p(1) = 0, and 0 < a < 1. The probability
q recognizes that in a real economy only a fraction of tax reports is e¤ec-
tively audited, since the auditing activity is costly, and that underreport is
4The possibility of corruption turns out to a¤ect the auditing probability settled by
a pro…t maximizing tax agency: corruption may either induce the agency to dismantle
auditing altogetheror, given that some auditing takes place, may induce it to audit evasion
more aggressively (Chander and Wilde, 1992).
6di¢cult to be detected even when an evader is audited. In other words, the
inverse relationship which characterizes p(®) draws on the objective di¢-
culty of demonstrating that the level of reported income is di¤erent from
the true tax base and admits that the possibility of detecting evasion is as
easier as greater the share of unreported income.5 Moreover, the …ne for
evasion is assumed to equal the maximum feasible …ne: ©e = M ¡¿®M.
Thisassumption is consistent with oneof themost popularconclusion ofthe
economic literature on crime deterrence, which implies that maximal …ne is
an important policy instrument to maximize welfare (Becker, 1968). If the
…ne were not maximal, it could be raised and the probability of detection
loweredwithout a¤ecting deterrence, but saving enforcement costs (Polinsky
and Shavell, 2001). Finally, following Chandler and Wilde (1992) and Ace-
moglu and Verdier (2000), among many others, I also assumethat the bribe
is proportional to the …ne for evasion, b =(1¡¸)©e, and that the taxpayer
minimizes the expected tax-related cost, being indi¤erent whether the cost
is due to tax, bribe, or …ne. Thus, the taxpayer problem is equivalent to
maximizing the expected disposable income, EV, where
EV ´f1¡[1¡¸(1 ¡m)Â] ap(®)g(1 ¡¿®)M: (5)
Given Â and m, theshare ofpro…t reportedto thetax authority satis…es
the following equation
a[1¡¸(1 ¡m)Â] [¿p(®)¡(1¡¿®)p® (®)] =¿ (6)
provided that 0 ·® ·1.6
If Â = 0, it is straightforward to conclude from (6) that the fraction of
unreported pro…t (i) increases with the tax rate ¿, (ii) decreases with the
probability of auditing a, and (iii) depends on the shape of p(®), that is
on the di¢culty of demonstrating the underreport of the tax base.7 When
Â > 0, corruption may arise. The presence of corruption in the economy
seriously a¤ects the taxpayer’s problem, since the expected pro…t in case
of evasion is increasing in the probability of being audited by a corruptible
5Alternatively, one can assume that the tax authority just knows the average pro…t
of the class to which the taxpayer belongs to, for example on the basis of his working
activity, and that the more is the di¤erence between reported and average pro…t the more
is the e¤ort of the auditor in verifying the taxpayer’s report.
6The second order condition for a maximum is always satis…ed, given the assumptions
on p (®). Note also that ap(0) = 1 and p®(1) = 0 are su¢cient conditions for an interior
solution.
7When Â = 0, the condition for the taxpayer to report the true tax base is ¿ ·
¡ap®(1)
1¡®[p(1)¡p®(1)]. For instance, when p(®) = 1 ¡®, the share of unreported pro…t becomes:
1 ¡® = 1
2(1 + 1
a ¡ 1
¿ ). In this case, it is easy to verify that when a
1+a < ¿ < a
1¡a an
interior solution emerges, while if either ¿ ·
a
1+a or ¿ ¸
a
1¡a then truthful report or full
evasion, respectively, holds.
7auditor. The possibility of avoiding thetax payment, even when the evasion
is detected, further stimulates tax evasion. In particular, the size of evasion
increases with the probability Â and decreases with the probability m of
detecting corruption. The same conclusions reported above about changing
¿ or a hold.8 Finally, envelope theorem implies that an increase of the tax
rate determines a reduction of the taxpayer’s expected pro…t.
3.2 Corruption in tax administration
Consider now an auditor who holds evidence of an entrepreneur’s evasion. A
bribe agreement between the entrepreneur and the auditor may be settled
such that the latter does not reveal the evasion and receives the bribe b
from the former. The auditor, however, is aware that the agreement can be
detected with a given probability m, which would imply he will have to pay
the…ne©b.9 Following Rose-Ackerman (1999), among others, I assume that
the …ne for corruption is proportional to the bribe: ©b = Ább, with Áb > 0.
Theauditorchooses between thetwo possiblestrategies, taking the bribe
and concealing the evidence of evasion or revealing the evasion, according
to the value ofthe expected pro…t. In particular, given m the auditor’s best
strategy is taking the bribe if and only if
(1 ¡m)b ¡m©b ¸0





3.3 The incentive to deter corruption
Bribery entails two main e¤ects. On one side, it dilutes tax evasion deter-
rence because it results in a lower payment by a taxpayer than the …ne for
evasion (Polinsky and Shavell, 2001). On the other side, it determines a
lower level ofpublicservices G in part because thegovernment does not get
the …ne for evasion ©e. Since public services are necessary to production,
the bribe agreement between an auditor and an entrepreneur determines a
negative externality for the rest of the economy, whose relevance depends
indeed on the amount ©e. Given that, in order to mitigate the e¤ects of
bribery the government is assumed to set at ©e the revenue for an inspector
who detects a bribe agreement.10
8When p(®) = 1 ¡ ® an equivalent conclusion to that reported in note 7 holds, with
b a ´ a[1 ¡¸(1 ¡m)Â] replacing a.
9Following Polinsky and Shavell (2001), in this case the bribe is given back to the
taxpayer.
10Of course, the main results of the paper carry out even if it was assumed that the
inspector’s gain is a share of the …ne for evasion.
8The activity of investigation entails a cost Z which depends on the di¢-
culty to provide evidence of a bribe agreement. In particular, it is assumed
that the higheris thelevel of pro…t M, more complex istheinvestigation ac-
tivity, and the higher is its cost: Z =zM. Thus, the expected pro…t due to
the investigation activity is given by ©epÂ¡Z, where pÂ denotes the prob-
ability of facing a corrupt auditor.11 It follows that given the size of evasion




Let the function p(¢) and the set of parameters f¿; ¸; Ábg de…ne the in-
stitutional framework which characterizes our economy. In the following I
will concentrate on an interior equilibrium (®¤, m¤, Â¤), with 0 < ®¤ < 1,
0 < m¤ <1, and 0 <Â¤ <1 such that:
² The rate of evasion maximizes the expected disposable income of the
taxpayer-entrepreneur, given M, m¤ and Â¤. This implies
a[1 ¡¸(1¡m¤)Â¤] [¿p(®¤) ¡(1¡¿®¤)p®(®¤)] = ¿:
² The auditor — who detects the taxpayer’s evasion — is indi¤erent





² The inspector is indi¤erent between investigating on the possibility of





An higher level of the …ne for evasion, which implies an higher level of
thebribe, both rises the incentive to investigateon bribery and theincentive
to conceal evidenceofevasion. In equilibrium, the interdependence between
corruption and monitoring implies that the conditional probability that the
auditor takes the bribe is inversely correlated to the …ne for evasion and to
the probability of detecting evasion.12 At the same time, the model implies
that the probability of detecting a bribe agreement is inversely related to
the …ne for corruption.
11If either the auditor does not detect evidence of evasion or he correctly reveals the
true tax base, then his payo¤ equals zero. At the same time, the inspector payo¤ equals
¡Z if he chooses to investigate when the auditor is honest.
12Note that this solution holds for values of the investigation cost su¢ciently low. If
Z > ©ep a corner solution emerges with Â = 1 and m = ©ep=Z.
9Figure 1: Tax Evasion and Corruption
3.4.1 Comparative statics
The simple expression for m makes possible to further investigate on the











[¿p(®) ¡(1¡¿®)p® (®)] = ¿ (9)
and
(1 ¡¿®)p(®)Â =z. (10)
Given the assumptions on p(®), equation (9) implies a function ®(Â) which
is continuous and decreasing in Â while equation (10) implies a function
Â(®) which is continuous, convex, and increasing in ® (Figure 1).13
Let consider the e¤ect of an increase in the tax rate ¿. Given Â and m,
an higher¿ induces thetaxpayerto increase theshare of incomeunreported
(in terms of Figure 1 the curve ®(Â) moves on the left). At the same time,
for any level of ® a raise in ¿ lowers the …ne for evasion which, in turn,
reduces the incentive of the inspector to investigate on bribery. This implies
a raise in the level of corruption (the curve Â(®) moves on the top). It
follows that an higher tax rate induces larger evasion in equilibrium:
13Note that the shapes of the two functions imply that there exists a set of parameters




Moreover, as an increase in the tax rate has an ambiguous e¤ect on the
equilibrium level of the …ne for evasion, in general the e¤ect of higher ¿ on
















where"®;¿ denotestheelasticity ofthe shareofreportedincomewithrespect
to thetax rate. When theelasticity is greaterthan, orequal to 1 an increase
in ¿ determines an increase in the …ne for evasion which implies stronger
incentive for the inspector to deter corruption. In equilibrium, the latter
e¤ect determines a reduction in the probability of corruption. Thus, an
inverse relationship between thesizeofevasion and that of corruption could
emerge.
Asregards theimpact ofachangein ¿ ontheexpecteddisposableincome











where the …rst term on the right-hand side refers to the e¤ect of ¿ on EV ¤
which goes through Â¤ while the second term refers to the direct e¤ect.
Since @EV
@Â > 0 and @EV
@¿ <0 while the sign of @Â¤
@¿ is ambiguous, in principle
it could be the case that an increase in ¿ increases EV¤. However, it can
be shown that endogenous deterrence implies that the overall e¤ect of an
increase in the tax rate on the expected disposable income is negative. In
other words, when the tax base is exogenously given the di¤usion of cor-





Proposition 1 Given the level of the tax base, a raise in the …scal pressure
causes an increase in the taxpayer’ evasion and a reduction of his expected
disposable income. Moreover, it may favor the di¤usion of corruption.
Let now assume an increase of the …ne rate for corruption Áb. The
analysis of the taxpayer highlighted that a change in Áb does not determine
any direct e¤ect on the decision of evading, since an increase in Áb does
not change neither the …ne for evasion nor the cost of paying a bribe.14
14Note that, under some circumstances, this conclusion holds true even without the
assumption of maximal …ne.
11However, the rise in Áb reduces the incentive of the auditor to take a bribe
thus determining a reduction of the equilibrium probability of monitoring
in the economy and no e¤ect at all on Â. The reduction in m implies an
increase in the rate of evasion: In terms of Figure 1 the curve ®(Â) moves
on the left. It follows that an increase in the …ne for corruption lowers the
probability of corruption and it raises the rate of evasion.
Proposition 2 In an economy where the di¤usion of corruption hinges on
taxpayers’ evasion, it is possible that the reduction of corruption, obtained
through higher …nes, realizes at the cost of larger evasion.
Proof. See appendix A.
4 Aggregate implications of tax evasion and cor-
ruption
Previous section illustrated the equilibrium of the model for a given level
of M. The notion of equilibrium implies that each entrepreneur takes into
account the impact of his decision about the tax report on the probability
p(®). Conversely, having only a marginal e¤ect with respect to the whole
economy, each entrepreneur takes as given the values of m and Â and he
does not internalize the e¤ect of his decision on the level of public capital
supplied by the government. Similarly, in deciding on whether to take a
bribe a single auditor does not take into account if other auditors have
been monitored by the inspectors, as if the inspectors investigate on bribe
agreements simultaneously. Thus, for given K and Gon aggregateprevious
results may be interpreted as follows.15
² Na =aJ entrepreneurs are audited.
² A fraction 1¡®oftheentrepreneurs’ total pro…t isconcealed; p(®)Na
entrepreneurs are detected to have underreported the tax base.




i inspectorsinvestigateonbribery, with Ni = 1
1+ÁbNa, which implies
that on aggregate the auditors have zero pro…t from bribery.
² The size of corruption — that is the number of auditors who take
bribes, Z
©e(®)Na — is such that each inspector is indi¤erent between
investigating and not investigating and that the aggregate pro…t from
the activity of detecting bribery is equal to zero.
15In the following the time index t and the symbol * are omitted when not necessary.











Nap(®) (1 ¡Â +Âm)
wherethetwo columns referto, respectively, thelevel ofincomeand its
frequency. Thus, the average disposable income of the entrepreneurs





where ª(¿;z) ´ f1 ¡a[1 ¡¸Â¤ (1 ¡m¤)] p(®¤)g(1¡¿®¤).
² the allocation of talent condition holds: the wage of public o¢cials Wt
equals the average disposable income of the entrepreneurs
Wt =ª(¿;z) Mt: (12)
In other words the aggregate implications relative to the size of tax
evasion, the di¤usion of corruption and the strength of deterrence mainly
rest on interpreting the probabilities p, m and Â as frequencies. Given
that, since the tax base is not easily observable by the government and
investigating on bribery is costly, it follows that only some bribe agreements
are detected and only some auditors decide of being corrupt.
4.1 Tax evasion and capital accumulation
Let now consider the supply of public capital by the government, in order
to investigate on the overall impact of tax evasion and corruption in the
economy.
The revenue of the government can be expressed as
R ´J¿®M +Nap(®)(1 ¡Â) ©e +Nap(®)Âm©b
whereJ¿®M measurestaxesvoluntary paid by theentrepreneurs, Nap(®)(1 ¡Â)©e
denotes the amount of …nes for evasion — that is what the entrepreneurs
would pay without corruptibility less the …nes which do not accrue to the
publicbudget becauseofcorruption —andNap(®)Âm©b isthetotal amount
of …nes for corruption.16 Substituting out the expression for R in equation
16Note that the expression for public revenue amounts to assume that the …nes paid
by those auditors who make a false reports and by the corresponding entrepreneurs are
con…scated.





where theleft-hand side is the di¤erence between the total amount of funds
raised by the government and the total cost of monitoring corruption.17
Given (2), (5) and (12), and normalizing J =1, it follows
G =[1 ¡(1+N)ª(¿;z)¡Niz](1¡¯)Y: (13)
Follwing Barro (1990), equations (1) and (13) can be used to get an
expression for G:





Substituting out this equation for G in (1), then I get the level of output in
terms of the level of capital
Y =
n







For a given K, the amount of output produced in the economy depends
on ª(¿;z). Ifthe entrepreneurs would truthfully report the tax basethen it
holds ª= 1¡¿. Tax evasion implies instead that ª(¿;z) > 1¡¿ and thus
that a lower level ofresources are available for supplying the public services
G. The following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 In any period t, tax evasion depresses the level of aggregate out-
put.
Substituting out the expression for Y in that for W, it follows
W = [A(1¡¯)]
1




H [ª(¿;z)] ´ ª(¿;z)[1¡(1+N)ª(¿; z) ¡Niz]
°
1¡° .
Apart from depressing the amount of output and the taxable income,
tax evasion also implies on average an higher share of disposable income.
17If the uncovering of a bribe agreement is considered as a risk that any corrupt auditor
faces, the total cost of deterrence activity for the economy only includes the auditing
cost. Under this assumption, Chandler and Wilde (1992) argue that one of the e¤ects
of corruption consists in the possibility of determining a reduction of …scal revenue as a
consequence of an increase in the tax rate. (On this point, see also Sanyal, Gang and
Goswami, 2000). Endogenous monitoring of corruption implies, instead, that the public
budget also takes into account the cost of detecting bribery.
14Thus, its overall e¤ects on the average level of the disposable income of
the entrepreneurs and on the wage of the public agents are ambiguous.
Moreover, sincetotal saving depends ontheaveragedisposableincomeinthe
economy thee¤ect oftax evasion on capital accumulation is ambiguous, too.
In particular, given (4), (11) and (14) dynamic equilibria in this economy
satisfy the following …rst order di¤erence equation in the stock of private
capital




where s ´ s(1+N)[A (1 ¡¯)]
1
1¡° . If ¯ =1 ¡° the model implies endoge-
nous growth at positive rate provided that sH (¢) >1; if ¯ < 1¡° then an











Clearly, both the average disposable income in the economy Wt and
the steady state capital Kss increase with H. At the same time, note
that the function H (ª) can be represented as an inverse U-shaped rela-
tion: it increases for relatively low levels of ª, attains a maximum when
ª =
(1¡Niz)(1¡°)
1+N , and then starts to decrease. Thus, the term ª charac-
terizes all relevant expressions of the model and its value determines the
long-run outcome of the economy.18
As shown above, the scale of government intervention and the hurdle
of detecting a bribe, here exempli…ed respectively by the policy parameter
¿ and the cost z, are the two main elements a¤ecting the value of ª. In
particular, it emerged that ª(¿; z) decreases with ¿ and increases with z.
The economy without corruptibility. Consider for the moment the
casewithout the potential of corruptibility, which implies that the economy
does not su¤er the cost of deterring corruption. In this case, all public
agents are involved in auditing the tax reports and the maximum steady
state capital stock is reached when ª=
1¡°
1+N.19
18Of course, the main implications of the model about the impact of corruption and
tax evasion on the steady state level of capital can be reinterpreted as implications on the
growth rate if ¯ = 1 ¡°.
19This condition corresponds to the e¢ciency condition for the size of the government
which characterizes the model in Barro (1990). When evasion is excluded by assumption
and ¯ = 1¡°, the production side of the model collapses to the case considered in Barro
(1990), and equation (15) represents an inverse U-shaped relation between the balanced
growth rate of capital and the size of the government G
°Y . In this case, the e¢ciency
condition reduces to ¿ = °.
15Similarly to Barro (1990), the e¤ects of government on capital accumu-
lation involve two channels: one relates to the negative e¤ect of taxation
on saving and thus on the level of investment of private agents; the other
is due to the positive e¤ect of public services on output.20 In the present
framework, however, these e¤ects of government intervention on capital ac-
cumulation coexist with those due to income redistribution resulting from
tax evasion and represented by the di¤erence between ª(¿; ¢) and 1 ¡¿.
The term ª(¿; ¢), with ª(¿;¢) > 1 ¡ ¿, takes into account the average
positive e¤ect of tax evasion in period t on the level of capital of the entre-
preneurs in period t +1, for a given level of output produced in t; the term
[1 ¡(1¡N)ª(¿;¢)]
°
1¡° takes into account instead thenegative e¤ect of tax
evasion on the supply of public services in period t, and thus on the level of
income of all agents in the economy. Therefore, on a theoretical level a pri-
ori tax evasion is neither e¢ciency enhancing nor e¢ciency detracting with
respect to the level ofdevelopment, its impact depending upon theratio be-
tween privatecapital and public services determined. In fact, when themix
between private and public inputs is severely biased towards thepublicone,
respect to the e¢cient composition, then a higher level of the private input,
due to tax evasion, more than compensate the reduction in the amount of
the public input. In other words, although tax evasion always results in
some degree of income redistribution, the strong negative e¤ect on capital
accumulation of an extremely high level of taxation might be diluted by tax
evasion, which thus determines a better use of resources and an higher level
of aggregate income.21
Let Wae denotethedisposableincomeofthepublic agentsin theabsence
of tax evasion and note that without corruptibility the disposable income of




then all individuals in the economy su¤er from the overall e¤ect of tax eva-
sion. This happens when thecontribution ofpublicservicesto production is
very relevant and the probability 1¡ap(®¤) issu¢ciently high, that iswhen
¸Â¤(1 ¡m¤) is high enough. In this case, any entrepreneur would bene…t
of an higher level of disposable income if all other entrepreneurs truthfully
reported thetax base. However, this outcomeisnot an equilibrium since for
20Note that if the entrepreneurs would truthfully report the tax base, then ª = 1 ¡¿.
21The possibility that the entire economy may bene…t of the misbehavior of some agents
is also suggested by Barreto (2000). The explanation, however, is di¤erent since Barreto
points at the e¤ect of lower bureaucratic red-tape eventually associated with corruption.
Of course, by assuming that the economy is plagued by bureaucratic red-tape, which
implies that some resources are lost within the public sector production process, the
positive e¤ect of tax evasion would be stronger and previous conclusion strengthened.
16each entrepreneur is pro…table to underreport the tax base when the other
entrepreneurs truthfully report. Conversely, if
V >W > Wae
then the entire economy ben…ts from tax evasion of entrepreneurs. This
result constitutes a further example of the general idea that misbehavior of
someagentsintheeconomy couldpromoteallocativee¢ciency by alleviating
the impact of distortions induced by government policy. Finally, if
V >Wae >W
then tax evasion is pro…table for those entrepreneurs whose evasion is not
detected but has a negative e¤ect for the economic system as a whole, since
it depresses the average level of disposable income and total saving. Tax
evasion results in some degree of redistribution from wage earners to the
lucky evaders. Moreover, since in this case aggregate saving in period t is
depressed by tax evasion, the level of capital available at t+1 is lower than
otherwisethus also implying a redistribution from all individuals ofthenext
generation to the lucky evaders of period t.
Di¤erences in the aggregate e¤ects of tax evasion on capital accumula-
tion and income mainly depend on the level of …scal pressure. For instance,
let assume the government sets the tax rate b ¿ = 1 ¡ 1¡°
1+N. If the entrepre-
neurs would truthfully report the tax base, then ª = 1¡°
1+N and theeconomy
approachs the maximum steady state level of capital. However, if they re-
alize to be favorable to underreport the tax base then ª(®¤ (b ¿)) > 1¡°
1+N.
Thus, an higher level of capital may beapproached in steady state ifthe tax
rate be higher than b ¿.22 In this case the direct positive e¤ect of tax evasion
on the level of saving and thus on capital accumulation is overwhelmed by
the negativeindirect e¤ect which goes through the level of output. Figure 2
depicts the function H [ª(¿;¢)] with truthful reports and tax evasion (dot-
ted line). In general, if ¿ < ¿0 then tax evasion determines a steady state
level of capital lower than that under truthful reports and thus it is nega-
tive for the aggregate economy. Conversely, if ¿ > ¿0 then tax evasion may
alleviate the strong negative e¤ect of …scal pressure on private investment,
thus determining an higher steady state level of capital.
Proposition 4 Tax evasion implies a di¤erent allocation of resources rel-
ative to the case of truthful report. A priori, it is neither bene…cial nor
22When corruptibility is excluded, it follows:
@H
@¿
= ª¿ [1 ¡° ¡(1 +N)ª]
1 ¡(1 +N)ª
:




17Figure 2: The long-run e¤ect of tax evasion
detrimental for the aggregate level of income, its e¤ect depending upon the
burden of …scal pressure.
The economy with corruptibility. The positive cost of detecting cor-
ruption determines a wedge between the total amount of taxes and …nes
paid by entrepreneurs and auditors and the amount of resources available
to the government for public spending. It follows that corruption reduces
the maximum steady state level of capital attainable, simply because some
resources are wasted in deterring it. In particular, the higher is the cost z,
the larger is the di¤usion of corruption among auditors, and the lower is the
steady state level of capital. Corruption, however, also dilutes tax evasion
deterrence thus determining a larger size of evasion and (on average) an
higher share of taxable income available for consumption and saving for the
entrepreneurs. Thus, similarly to the analysis developed before, corruption
a¤ects the public-private inputs ratio and in principle it might determine a
level of capital in steady state higher than that without coruptibility, if the
tax rate is extremely high.23
23Again the misbehavior of some agents in the economy could promote allocative e¢-
ciency by alleviating the impact of distortions induced by government policy. Aidt (2003)
reviewed some explanations which support the idea that corruption can enhance allocative
e¢ciency.
18In thepresent simpleframework, theimpact of corruption on thelevel of
development depends on the relative magnitudes of the tax rate ¿ and the
unit cost of bribe detecting z. In particular, as other models in the litera-
ture also the present one hinges on the idea that the di¤usion of corruption
is determined by the institutional design of the economy, here exempli…ed
by the modelling of deterrence. In this case, once institutions have been
determined, history and expectations do not have any signi…cative role in
determining the economic outcome. A main element in determining the
di¤usion of corruption, however, is related to the hurdle of detecting the re-
ward an auditor receives when heconceals the evidence ofan entrepreneur’s
evasion. Assuming that the level of di¢culty is constant with respect to
the stage of development may be a restrictive assumption. In fact, it seems
more plausible to assumethat the level of trasparency and thus theobstacle
in detecting a bribe varies with the level of economic development in that
the higher is the stage of development thehigher is thelevel of trasparency.
This consideration implies that the state of the economy a¤ects a single
agent decision and that a peculiar form of external increasing returns to
scale in the bribe detection activity arises.
A simple way to formalize previous consideration consists in assuming
that theunit cost zisa decreasing function oftheaggregatelevel ofeconomic
activity.24 In this case a rich set of dynamics including poverty traps and
multiple equilibria due to corruption may arise. To be speci…c, let zt =
z(Kt) with z a decreasing function of K that tends to zero as K ! 1 and
takes on a large value at zero, such that Â = 1 for a low level of capital.
Now the equilibrium patterns ofcapital stock are described by the following
di¤erence equation:




Since z(Kt) is decreasing in K thefunction H isincreasing in K. Hence,
the function F is increasing in K. Moreover, F (K) is constrained between
the two polar cases which characterize the equilibrium sequences of capital
under absence of corruption, Â = 0, and full corruption, Â = 1. Now the
economy may posses multiplesteady states and corruption trapscan emerge.
A possible case is depicted in …gure (3), where history matters: if K0 <K000
then the economy will asymptotically end up with a low level of capital;
conversely, if the economy starts out above the unstable steady state K000
then it converges to K0 after a period of sustained growth.25
24An alternative, more standard, explanation for the inverse relationship between the
costz and the stage ofeconomic developmentis relatedto the idea that, because oflearning
by doing, the information about an activity is a by-product of production. Azariadis and
Chakraborty (1999), for example, introduces a similar assumption in modelling the state
19Figure 3: Dynamics with decreasing cost of detecting corruption
5 Conclusions
Many authors have recently pointed out to tax evasion and corruption as
two main determinants of thelong-term performance of many countries and
regions. In this paper I dealt with the the long-run implications of tax eva-
sion and corruption, by developing a simple model of economic growth with
government intervention. The government is assumed to providepublic ser-
vices necessary to production and to employ public agents for auditing the
entrepreneurstax reportsand fordevising investigation on bribery. Tax eva-
sion consists in not revealing thetruetax base; corruption consists in taking
a bribe from an entrepreneurin order to conceal evidenceofhisevasion. The
case of endogenous deterrence is analyzed on the premise that this re‡ects
in a reliable way how enforcement is actually delivered in the real world.
In general, tax evasion and corruption are found to a¤ect income distribu-
tion and to have ambiguous e¤ects on the level of economic development.
In fact, the model suggests that tax evasion and corruption may be either
bene…cial or detrimental for the aggregate level of income, the outcome de-
veri…cation cost of bankruptcy.
25History dependency and multiple equilibria also arise when the incentive to corruption
perceived by a single agent also depends on his expectation about how many individuals
in the same organization are corrupt. See Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Aidt (2003) for a
review of this topic.
20pending upon the burden of …scal pressure and thelevel oftrasparency. The
enhancing e¤ect of corruption on tax evasion and itsnegative impact on eco-
nomic development are consistent with some recent empirical evidence. In
fact large size of uno¢cial activity and low level of tax revenue tends to
be associated with high level of corruption (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman,
and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000). At the same time,
corruption is found to be correlated negatively with investment and income
growth rates (Mauro, 1995; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Mèon and Sekkat, 2005).
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evaluated at the optimum is strictly negative. Therefore, the sign of the



































which is negative. The sign of the derivative of Â¤ with respect to Áb is the























a[2¿p® ¡(1¡¿®¤)p®®] ¡ a¸Â¤
(1+Áb)2a







which is negative. Thus, dÂ¤=dÁÂ < 0.
The sign of the derivative of ®¤ with respect to ¿ is the same as the sign






























which is negative. Thus, d®¤=d¿ <0. The sign of the derivative of Â¤ with






















a[2¿p® ¡(1 ¡¿®¤)p®®] a[p +®¤p®] ¡1
¡[¿p(®¤) ¡(1 ¡¿®¤)p®] Â¤ ¡ ®¤z
(1¡¿®¤)
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
which is ambiguous.
24